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Abstract
This Article challenges the global science standard for putting new
drugs on pharmacy shelves.  The primary premise is that the “gold stan-
dard” of group experimental design is an antiquated extension of drug
development’s crude-science past, and is inconsistent with the precision of
contemporary genetics— the science that increasingly dominates the drug
development pipeline.  The Article identifies law– policy options that would
raise the standard for human clinical research under the International Con-
ference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use.
Introduction
The endeavor of biopharmaceutical research and development (R&D)
never has been so global— a trend complemented by collaborations that
cross borders and the realization of ever-increasing international harmoni-
zation of human clinical trial research norms.  Through the International
Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration
of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), government and industry repre-
sentatives have established shared standards for human clinical research1
to access the three largest pharmaceutical markets: the United States,
Europe, and Japan.2  The primary goals of these standards are the reduc-
tion of duplication and waste in clinical research, the research needs of
innovative drug developers, and the drug developers’ demand for human
clinical trial data. 3
The United States-based drug development industries are now out-
sourcing most of their clinical research to contract research organizations
(CROs)— companies in the business of providing clinical research services
that access health care networks outside of the United States.4  Conse-
1. See generally E9 Guidance on Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials, 63 Fed.
Reg. 49,583 (Sept. 16, 1998) [hereinafter E9 Guidance]; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
HARMONISATION OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR
HUMAN USE, ICH HARMONISED TRIPARTITE GUIDELINE: GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRAC-
TICE E6(R1) (1996), available at http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_
Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E6_R1/Step4/E6_R1__Guideline.pdf [hereinafter ICH
GUIDELINES].  For more information about the ICH, visit the official Internet site ICH,
http://www.ich.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter ICH WEBSITE].
2. The United States is the largest pharmaceutical market, followed by Europe. See
W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it Have Ended Differently in the European
Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 375 (2006).
3. See E9 Guidance, supra note 1, at 49,583. R
4. See Robert M. Califf, Clinical Trials Bureaucracy: Unintended Consequences of
Well-Intentioned Policy, 3 CLINICAL TRIALS 496, 497 (2006); Miho Nagano, Big Pharma
Looks for a Fix, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2008, at A9.  For further information
about the CRO industry, visit the Internet site of the Association of Clinical Research
Organizations (ACRO). ASSOCIATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.
acrohealth.org/cro-market1.html (last visited July 17, 2011) [hereinafter ACRO WEB-
SITE].  CROs generated $20 billion in revenue in 2010 and, in 2008, conducted clinical
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\45-1\CIN104.txt unknown Seq: 3 21-MAR-12 11:16
2012 All that is Gold Does Not Glitter 187
quently, the United States, the epicenter for prescription drug R&D,5 has
become a major exporter of human clinical trial research and an importer
of resulting data.6  Yet, even with this outsourcing and exporting trend, the
current amount of clinical research occurring within the United States is
unprecedented: In the first half of this decade alone, domestic clinical
research increased nearly fifty percent.7  Phase III trials, the final stage of
clinical research before drug approval applications are submitted, have
expanded to 20,000 subjects from just 3,000 five years ago, doubling their
cost and surpassing $100 million in expenditures.8  According to the phar-
maceutical industry, “[i]n 2009, America’s pharmaceutical research and
biotechnology companies continued to make the world’s largest investment
in pharmaceutical R&D, holding steady with $65.3 billion spent on R&D,
including $45.8 billion by PhRMA members alone.”9
In spite of this tremendous investment in drug R&D, the United States
approved just eighteen new drugs in 2007, a twenty-five year low; 2008
(twenty-four approvals) and 2009 (twenty-six approvals) were not much
trials involving more than 2 million participants in 115 countries. Id.; see also Barbara J.
Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 424 (2010).
5. For information about the U.S. biopharmaceutical sector, visit the Internet sites
of the United States-based pharmaceutical trade organization (PhRMA) and the biotech-
nology trade organization (BIO). PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org (last visited July 17,
2011); BIO: BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, http://www.bio.org (last visited
July 17, 2011).  The United States has pursued global life-science leader status through
aggressive technology transfer laws and policies that have integrated academia, industry,
and government in biomedical research and development. See generally ROGER L. GEI-
GER, RESEARCH & RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE, AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES SINCE WORLD
WAR II (2004); Michael J. Malinowski, A Discourse on the Public Nature of Research in
Contemporary Life Science: A Law-Policy Proposal to Promote the Public Nature of
Research in Contemporary Life Science, Keynote Address to Academia Sinica (Dec. 21,
2008), in BIENNIAL REV. L. SCI. & TECH. 2 (Wen-Tsong Chiou ed., 2010) [hereinafter
Discourse on Public Nature]; Michael J. Malinowski & Radhika Rao, Legal Limitations on
Genetic Research and the Commercialization of Its Results, 54 AM. J. COMP. LAW 45, 45
(2006); see also Owen C.B. Hughes, Alan L. Jakimo & Michael J. Malinowski, United
States Regulation of Stem Cell Research: Recasting Government’s Role and Questions to be
Resolved, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383, 392– 400 (2008).  The United States invests tens of
billions of dollars in basic research, transfers ownership of resulting inventions to uni-
versities and others conditioned on commercial application, and it has intensely done so
for over two decades. See generally Discourse on Public Nature, supra; GEIGER, supra.
For information about U.S. federal technology transfer law and policy, including back-
ground information, economic theory, enacting legislation, and technical requirements,
see generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-126, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES (1998) [hereinafter
GAO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER].
6. Nagano, supra note 4.  For updated general information on the CRO industry, R
see ACRO WEBSITE, supra note 4. R
7. The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
CLINICAL TRIAL RECRUITMENT & ENROLLMENT: A CALL FOR INCREASED OVERSIGHT 5 (Nov.
2009) (Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law, White Paper) [hereinafter Center for Health White
Paper].
8. See Nagano, supra note 4. R
9. Letter from PhRMA’s President and CEO, in PROFILE: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 5,
5 (2010), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/159/?profile_2010_
final.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2012); see also generally PhRMA, supra note 5. R
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better.10  Recent market controversies in recent years surrounding products
such as Vioxx (pain management), Avandia (treatment for Type-2 diabe-
tes), and Accutane (acne medication) have raised concerns regarding the
FDA’s performance and trustworthiness in overseeing the nation’s pharma-
ceutical market.11  Congress recognized and addressed the problem with
the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA).12
This sweeping legislation augments premarket clinical studies, enhances
the evidentiary standard, and imposes post-market communication
through an Internet-based system.13
This Article questions the global “gold standard” for human clinical
trial research and new drug approvals— namely, shared reliance through
the ICH on statistical analysis to compile group means as the basis for
market approval, known as group experimental design (GD).14  The Article
argues that heavy reliance on GD-generated clinical research data risks low
predictive value about a prescription medicine’s actual effect on individu-
als, including members of the groups under study, and continuation of the
drug industries’ fifteen-year slump in drug development.15  In light of this
10. Steven Burrill, Steven Burrill Predicts Biotechnology’s Fortunes for First-Half 2009,
PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Jan. 19, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 7402398; Jared A. Favole,
FDA Approved More Drugs in 2008, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at A9; Jenna Greene, Has
Obama Redirected the Regulatory System?  After One Year, Some Agencies Can’t Write Rules
Fast Enough, While Others Sit and Wait, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 18, 2010, at 11; Nagano, supra
note 4 (noting 17 new U.S. drug approvals in 2007).  PhRMA claims there were 34 new R
drug approvals in 2009— an inconsistency attributable to subjective determinations as to
whether a drug is “new” or a modified version of one that already has reached the mar-
ket.  Industry Profile, supra note 9, at ii; see also Angus Robertson, New Drug Approvals R
on Pace to Exceed 2008 Total, RES. RECAP, June 9, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
11054446.
11. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY:
IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS
(2006) [hereinafter GAO DRUG SAFETY]; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG
SAFETY: ACTION STEPS FOR CONGRESS (2006) [hereinafter IOM DRUG SAFETY]; Thomas,
supra note 2, at 365. R
12. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in sections of 21 U.S.C.).
13. Id.  For a thorough discussion of the FDAAA, see generally Evans, supra note 4; R
Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food and Drug Administration to Require Data Access
and Control Use Rights in the Sentinel Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67 (2010).
14. See JANINE E. JANOSKY ET AL., SINGLE SUBJECT DESIGNS IN BIOMEDICINE 81 (2009);
Gina Green, On Single-Case and “N of 1” Research Designs for Evaluating Treatments for
Autism Spectrum Disorders 5 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
The technicalities of GD and single subject research design (SSRD) are addressed in
depth, both individually and in a comparative fashion, in Michael J. Malinowski &
Grant G. Gautreaux, Drug Development— Stuck in a State of Puberty?  Regulatory Reform
of Human Clinical Research to Raise Responsiveness to the Reality of Human Variability, ST.
LOUIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Drug Development], which presents an
extensive science background discussion in Part II of that Article.  This Article builds
upon the science-based proposal to implement SSRD into U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration law and policy presented in Drug Development with a focus on changing the
international norms for human clinical research in drug development.  Specifically, it
focuses on the ICH and the interplay between the European Medicines Agency (EMA),
the FDA, and United States-based industry on the global level.
15. See generally Janosky, supra note 14; Green, supra note 14. See infra note 49 and R
the accompanying text (quoting Dr. Francis Collins regarding the industry’s slump).
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risk, the “gold standard” should be modified to reflect the increased preci-
sion associated with the “genomics revolution” in the drug development
pipeline.16
Part I of the Article profiles the ICH and the globalization of human
clinical research— primarily through proliferation of CROs with interna-
tional networks in health care systems that provide access to patients.
Emphasis is placed on the U.S. drug development industries’ trend towards
outsourcing human clinical research (and toxicology studies) to CROs,
and exporting research to jurisdictions outside of the United States.17  This
focus is reflective of the United States’ influence on global norms for
human clinical research through the ICH, the sheer amount of research
U.S. interests undertake, the direct international interface of the United
States-based industries through their human clinical trial research activi-
ties, and their presence in the world’s major pharmaceutical markets.
Part II challenges reliance– by commercial drug developers, but also
governments, regulators, and the health care establishment– on GD as the
gold standard for human clinical trial research.  This section introduces
single subject research design (SSRD) as a methodology alternative or com-
plement to GD for human clinical research in drug development.18  Part III
proposes law-policy reforms that modify the ICH standard for human
clinical research to include SSRD.  This proposal explores both European
Union (EU) and United States-based approaches; the latter focus on com-
mercial incentives and the United States’ influence on clinical trial stan-
dards through the ICH and its global market presence.
I. The Globalization of Human Clinical Research
Significant progress has been made over the last two decades to har-
monize science criteria among the world’s three largest pharmaceutical
markets: the United States, Europe, and Japan.19  The ICH gathers regula-
tory authorities and industry representatives from these markets to collec-
For a full discussion of the slump in drug development, see Drug Development, supra
note 14, and the citations therein. R
16. Symposium, Proceedings of “The Genomics Revolution?  Science, Law, and Policy,
66 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) [hereinafter Genomics Revolution?].
17. Nagano, supra note 4. R
18. For a full discussion of SSRD and GD in the context of U.S. FDA law and policy,
see generally Drug Development, supra note 14, at Parts II & IV; Janosky, supra note 14; R
Green, supra note 14; Robert H. Horner et al., The Use of Single-Subject Research to Iden- R
tify Evidence-Based Practice in Special Education, 71 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 165 (2005).
See also J.M. JOHNSTON & H.S. PENNYPACKER, Strategic Issues, in STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 296 (2d ed. 1993); J.M. JOHNSTON & H. S. PENNYPACKER, Why
Behavior Analysis is a Natural Science, in READINGS FOR STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH 3 (2d ed. 1993); Mark Wolery & Susan R. Harris, Interpreting Results of
Single-Subject Research Designs, 62 PHYSICAL THERAPY 445– 52 (1982).  Single subject
studies and “N-of-1” (“number-of-one”) trials often are comingled, though most SSRD
studies involve focused studies of and between multiple participants— not literally stud-
ies of single subjects.
19. ICH WEBSITE, supra note 2. R
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tively evaluate scientific and technical aspects of product registration.20
Their primary objective is to reduce, and, ideally avoid, duplication of
R&D for new medicines.21  As a result, the ICH has developed shared sci-
entific standards for clinical data and good clinical practice.22  Notably,
the ICH issued E9 Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials in 1998 to harmo-
nize statistical methodologies used to support marketing applications.23
The government members have directly recognized ICH standards in
their domestic law.  The FDA, for example, conditions acceptance of data
gathered outside the United States on compliance with U.S. regulations or
ICH guidelines for good clinical practice.24  More generally, ICH partici-
pants have extended their areas of consensus— incorporated into their
domestic law-policy and industry operations— beyond the ICH markets
through their biopharmaceutical R&D activities in the rest of the world.25
Also, during the last few decades, science and its accompanying standards
have transcended borders via global interface between scientific communi-
ties, industry interests, and governments engaged in the Human Genome
Project and its progeny.26
More fundamentally, the sheer presence of U.S. interests in both
biopharmaceutical R&D and the major markets for prescription medica-
tions has promoted the gold standard for human clinical trials throughout
the world.27  The U.S. government has distinguished itself through aggres-
sive and direct investment in scientific research in an effort to raise the
base of science— a practice inspired by the threat of annihilation by tech-
nology during WWII.  The U.S. government has also distinguished itself
through aggressive federal technology transfer laws, and policies that draw
academia and industry together.28  Indicative of its prominence, the United
States invests more in scientific research than any counterpart, as do the
American biopharmaceutical commercial interests.29
In order to access larger patient pools for clinical research, United
States-based CROs are present in more than seventy countries, with sub-
stantial recent and ongoing expansion in Eastern Europe, India, Latin
20. See id.
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. R
22. Michael J. Malinowski, Ethics in a Global Pharmaceutical Environment, 5 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 57, 70– 71 (2006).
23. See E9 Guidance, supra note 1, at 49,583– 97. R
24. ICH GUIDELINES, supra note 1. R
25. See generally INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS &
ASSOCIATIONS, FOSTERING A POSITIVE DIALOGUE ON BEHALF OF THE RESEARCH-BASED PHARMA-
CEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2010).
26. See generally Genomics Revolution?, supra note 16. R
27. See generally Industry Profile, supra note 9; BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZA- R
TION, GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY (2008), http://www.bio.org/sites/default/?files/Biotech
Guide2008.pdf; Malinowski & Rao, supra note 5.  The internet site for the U.S. biotech- R
nology industrial organization is available at http://www.bio.org, and its European
counterpart is available at http://www.europabio.org.
28. Discourse on Public Nature, supra note 5, at 2– 24; see Geiger, supra note 5, at 7. R
29. See generally Industry Profile, supra note 9; Center for Health White Paper, supra R
note 7, at 5; Discourse on Public Nature, supra note 5; GAO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, R
supra note 5. R
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America, Russia, and other emerging markets.30  In addition to the recep-
tiveness of health care systems, medical professionals, and patients to CRO
recruitment efforts, these emerging markets offer “a large number of ‘treat-
ment-naive patients’ who aren’t taking other drugs and are thus the best
candidates for trials.”31
II. The Gold Science Standard and a Platinum Alternative32
The United States FDA did not require new drug sponsors to demon-
strate efficacy until 1962, when the European Union (then the European
Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community) did
the same.  This change was prompted by the thalidomide fiasco (a medica-
tion used for pregnancy-associated nausea that caused children to be born
without limbs).33  Since introducing the efficacy requirement, the core
standard for market approval has been to beat a placebo or sugar pill.  It is
often enough for the drug to beat the placebo by one or two percentage
points in a defined population, as long as it also makes a showing of tolera-
ble safety.34  Adverse drug reactions are accepted as an inevitable counter-
part to prescription medications, and are a norm in the practice of
medicine.35
To satisfy the efficacy standard, the FDA and new drug sponsors rely
heavily upon GD as the preferred methodology for human clinical trials.
GD refers to randomized studies in groups of people and statistical analy-
sis to compile representative group means.36  The reality of human varia-
bility suggests, however, that group averages may predict little about the
actual impact of prescription medicines on specific individuals, including
the studies’ participants who are the sources of the data used to generate
the averages.37  In other words, GD produces statistical abstracts that blan-
ket over individual subjects, and, ultimately, any patient who receives the
drug.
30. See generally supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
31. See generally Nagano, supra note 4. R
32. This section is drawn from the U.S. domestic law counterpart to this Article,
Drug Development, supra note 14, at Part II.B. R
33. Thomas, supra note 2, at 372 n.79, 373– 74 nn.94– 99; see infra notes 95– 97 and R
accompanying text; see generally Michael J. Malinowski, FDA Regulation of Biotechnology
Products for Human Use, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIO-
TECHNOLOGY 221 (Thomas J. Murray & Max Mehlman eds., 2002); David Classen, Medi-
cation Safety: Moving from Illusion to Reality, 289 JAMA 1154, 1154– 56 (2003).
34. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2011); A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND
REGULATION 25 (Kenneth R. Pin˜a & Wayne L. Pines eds., 3d ed. 2002), available at http:/
/www.fdli.org/pubs/previews/pdf/practical-guide.pdf; Thomas, supra note 2. R
35. Classen, supra note 33, at 1154– 56; Jeffrey P. Braff et al., Patient-Tailored R
Medicine, Part One: The Impact of Race and Genetics on Medicine, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI.
L. 1 (2008); Jeffrey P. Braff et al., Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part Two: Personalized
Medicine and the Legal Landscape, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 7 (2009).
36. See Drug Development, supra note 14, at Part II; see generally Janosky, supra note R
14; Green, supra note 14. R
37. See generally Janosky, supra note 14. R
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The crudeness of the GD standard in human clinical research for new
drug R&D has affected the United States’ broader law-policy regulatory
scheme governing pharmaceutical use when delivering patient care.  The
U.S. commercial and privatized environment gives drug sponsors wide dis-
cretion over the studies they undertake and the product uses they seek in
new drug applications.38  The drug sponsors compile applications know-
ing that, once their products reach pharmacy shelves, the medical profes-
sion will embrace off-label uses that are often completely removed from the
data before the FDA and the agency’s actual approval for market access.
The D.C. Circuit has observed that, “[N]either Congress nor the FDA has
attempted to regulate the off-label use of drugs by doctors and consumers.
A physician may prescribe a legal drug to serve any purpose that he or she
deems appropriate, regardless of whether the drug has been approved for
that use by the FDA.”39
Often there are wide gaps between clinical data and clinical use of
pharmaceuticals.  For example, “[f]ew, if any, psychotropic drugs have
been adequately evaluated in people with developmental disabilities,
despite repeated calls for further research . . . .  As in years past, further
research is needed to produce data that will guide physicians in accurately
matching drugs to patients.”40  Ultimately, the United States relies upon
the medical profession to use patient-by-patient experiences over time to
decipher prescription medications after they have been released on the
market.  In fact, according to a 2000 study published in the American Jour-
nal of Economics and Sociology, most cancer and AIDS patients receive
drugs that are not FDA-certified for the prescribed use; and, in many fields
of medicine, a majority of patients are prescribed at least one off-label
drug.41  This study also concluded that 80– 90 percent of pediatric patient
regimens involve at least one off-label prescription.42
Physician off-label discretion provides a powerful incentive for aggres-
sive drug manufacturers to market their products to both health care prov-
iders and patients— the consumers in the U.S. system.  These investments
have proven to be effective and lucrative.  Throughout much of the twenti-
eth century and into the present one, pharmaceutical R&D has been the
most profitable industry in the United States, and, in spite of its unprece-
dented investment in R&D, the pharmaceutical sector presently spends
more on marketing than on R&D.43
38. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 (2001); Washington
Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Washington Legal Found.
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated in part on other grounds, 202
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
39. See Henney, 202 F.3d at 333; see also Evans, supra note 4, at 509– 10. R
40. Alan Poling, et al., Pharmaceutical Interventions and Developmental Disabilities, in
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: ETIOLOGY, ASSESSMENT, INTERVENTION, AND INTEGRATION 105,
119 (W. Larry Williams ed., 2004).
41. Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against
FDA Efficacy Requirements? A Critical Analysis of Physicians’ Argumentation for Initial
Efficacy, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 743 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
42. Id. at 755.
43. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES xv, 3, 11– 12 (2004).
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Experience illustrates the obvious danger of waiting to meaningfully
understand prescription drugs’ effect on individuals until after they are on
the pharmacy shelves and patients are receiving physician care rather than
volunteering for regulated studies.  Even when marketed legally,44 only
one-third of prescription medicines act as expected when prescribed to
patients, and according to the Institute of Medicine, there are approxi-
mately two million serious adverse drug reactions per year,45 resulting in
two million hospitalizations and 100,000 deaths annually.46 While some
of these adverse reactions derive from errors when prescribing and dis-
pensing the medications, many of them are attributable to variations
among individuals, such as how they metabolize the drugs.47
The opportunity costs to human health– lost opportunities for alterna-
tive treatment and investment in R&D and manufacturing resources for
new drug efforts– are undefined.  Market outcomes also suggest that drug
development is suffering from the low R&D science standard.  While an
infusion of government and private investment has advanced genetic sci-
ence beyond expectations, it has not produced a meaningful mass of new
drugs in recent years: 2007 was the worst year for new drug approvals in a
quarter of a century.48  As observed by Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the
National Institute of Health (NIH) and the head of the U.S. government’s
effort to map the human genome, “the drug industry’s research productiv-
ity has been declining for 15 years, ‘and it certainly doesn’t show any signs
of turning upward.’”49  Concern and frustration have inspired the estab-
lishment of a new federal research center, under Dr. Collins’ direction, to
help the industry out of its slump.50
Experiences with Vioxx (a painkiller removed from the market after
years of use due to an association with both heart attacks and strokes, and
challenges to efficacy claims) and controversies involving drugs such as
Avandia (a diabetes drug associated with increased rates of heart attack
44. “In its 2006 policy guide, the FDA estimated there are up to several thousand
drugs— including nearly 2% of all prescription drugs— marketed illegally without
required FDA approval.  These include compounds with unapproved active ingredients
such as antihistamines, narcotics and sedatives.”  Harris Meyer, Medicine: Costly Stamp
of Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at E3, available at 2010 WLNR 1055167.
45. Braff, supra note 35, at 9, 16– 17. R
46. B.S. Shastry, Pharmacogenetics and the Concept of Individualized Medicine, 6
PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 16, 16 (2006).  For a discussion of the tremendous variability in
the practice of medicine for the same diagnoses, see John Carey, Medical Guesswork:
From Heart Surgery to Prostate Care, The Health Industry Knows Little About Which Com-
mon Treatments Really Work, 3989 BUS. WK. 72 (2006).
47. Petra A. Thu¨rmann, Prescribing Errors Resulting in Adverse Drug Events: How Can
They Be Prevented?, 5 EXPERT OPINION ON DRUG SAFETY 489, 489– 93 (2006); Kathryn A.
Phillips et al., Potential Role of Pharmacogenomics in Reducing Adverse Drug Reactions: A
Systematic Review, 286 JAMA 2270, 2270– 79 (2001).
48. See supra notes 10– 13 and accompanying text; see generally Burrill, supra note R
10. R
49. Gardiner Harris, New Federal Research Center Will Help Develop Medicines, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1 (discussing the federal government’s decision to launch a
billion-dollar drug development center to help the industry create new pharmaceuticals
and quoting Dr. Francis S. Collins, Director of the National Institute of Health).
50. Id.
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and heart failure) raise serious questions about the reliability of FDA over-
sight.51  The Government Accountability Office and Institute of Medicine
have seriously questioned the FDA’s regulatory performance after approv-
ing drugs which become available for use with follow-on study conditions
that are not enforced.52
An area of concern is the FDA’s execution of section 506B of the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA)53— a provision that
creates a presumption in favor of market approval with post-marketing
study conditions, accompanied by FDA enforcement authority.54
Although section 506B is consistent with the addition of efficiency, effi-
cacy, and safety to the FDA’s mission for review and approval of new
drugs,55 the agency has been lax in enforcing the post-marketing study
conditions.56  Congress responded with the sweeping FDAAA legislation,
which culls more data during the clinical trial process using the familiar
GD science standard.57
Given that the FDA is not executing its post-marketing responsibilities,
focus must shift to the science standard for putting new drugs on the mar-
ket.  In this age of genetic precision in drug R&D, the GD gold standard
must be revisited.  Drug development should be aligned with the patient-
centered focus of drug delivery in health care.  It is unacceptable to rely so
heavily on patient-physician experiences over extended periods of time,
typically several years, to acquire meaningful understanding of prescrip-
tion medications on pharmacy shelves that are relied upon to treat human
ailments.58  As recognized by Dr. Janosky, an expert in SSRD:
In a primary care setting, the patient generally exhibits symptoms and the
physician follows evidence-based or appropriate steps to treat these symp-
51. See generally Thomas, supra note 2.  According to the editors of the New England R
Journal of Medicine, “with Vioxx, Merck and the FDA acted out of ruthless, short-sighted,
and irresponsible self-interest.”  Richard Horton, Editorial, Vioxx, the Implosion of Merck,
and Aftershocks at the FDA, 364 LANCET 1995, 1996 (2004).
52. See generally GAO Drug Safety, supra note 11; IOM Drug Safety, supra note 11. R
53. 21 U.S.C. § 356b (2006).
54. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified primarily in sections throughout 21 U.S.C., including
§§ 352, 355, 356, 360aaa-1– 3, 379r) [hereinafter FDAMA].  Section 506B of FDAMA, the
provision that promotes this presumption in favor of market approval, is accompanied
by FDA enforcement authority under 21 U.S.C. § 356b. See 21 U.S.C. § 356b; Thomas,
supra note 2, at 367. R
55. Malinowski, supra note 33. R
56. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-68, DRUG SAFETY: FDA HAS BEGUN
EFFORTS TO ENHANCE POSTMARKET SAFETY, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED (2009).
57. See supra notes 12– 13 and accompanying text.  The FDAAA methodology also R
includes gathering and disseminating information from the market via Sentinel, an
expansive Internet-driven information system presently under construction. See gener-
ally Evans, supra note 4; Evans, supra note 13.  For information about Sentinel, see gen- R
erally FDA, The Sentinel Initiative: An Update on FDA’s Progress in Building a National
Electronic System for Monitoring the Postmarket Safety of FDA-Approved Drugs and Other
Medical Products (July 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAs
SentinelInitiative/UCM233360.pdf (last visited July 17, 2011).
58. Wylie Burke & Bruce M. Psaty, Personalized Medicine in the Era of Genomics, 298
JAMA 1682, 1682– 84 (2007).
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toms.  The physician evaluates the patient’s history signs, symptoms, medi-
cal test results, and examines the patient, and subsequently implements a
treatment or intervention if warranted. . . .  In primary care settings, stan-
dardized procedures are employed that include objective measurement of the
outcomes, such as systolic blood pressure measurements.  These design and
intervention procedures are analogous to the standardized procedures used
in single subject research designs, such as testing the effectiveness of a medi-
cation over a course of time.59
In fact, using GD to develop and approve new drugs may directly restrain
the actual practice of medicine when used on-label.  As explained by the
renowned Dr. Jerome Groopman:
Clinical algorithms can be useful for run-of-the-mill diagnosis and treat-
ment— distinguishing strep throat from viral pharyngitis, for example.  But
they quickly fall apart when a doctor needs to think outside their boxes,
when symptoms are vague, or multiple and confusing, or when test results
are inexact.  In such cases— the kinds of cases where we most need a discern-
ing doctor— algorithms discourage physicians from thinking independently
and creatively.  Instead of expanding a doctor’s thinking, they can constrain
it.60
For over half a century, science literature has discussed SSRD as an
alternative natural science research methodology to GD.61  SSRD draws
much more data from individual subjects and works with the subjects’ data
directly, rather than through group statistics:
The core SSRD methodology is to repeat comparisons of control and treat-
ment conditions with the same individual or staggered across similar indi-
viduals, graph the data on a subject-by-subject basis, and then analyze the
resulting data.  Human variability is accounted for in single subject research
by manipulating environmental variables that occasion steady states of
responding— rather than herding subjects through statistical analysis into
what are declared to be steady states for the individual, but only actually
represent the group averages.62
While a portfolio of disciplines, including behavior analysis, educa-
tion, physical therapy, and occupational therapy, have developed SSRD
over the years, biomedicine has largely ignored the methodology.63  It has
done so despite the fact that SSRD’s focus on individuals would allow
human clinical research to better approximate the practice of medicine: “To
59. JANOSKY, supra note 14, at 81. R
60. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 5 (2008).
61. See generally Janosky, supra note 14; see also Horner et al., supra note 18, at R
165– 79; J. M. JOHNSTON & H. S. PENNYPACKER, Strategic Issues, in STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 296– 309 (2d ed. 1993); J. M. JOHNSTON & H. S. PENNYPACKER,
Why Behavior Analysis is a Natural Science, in READINGS FOR STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 3– 17 (2d Ed. 1993); John O. Cooper, Timothy E. Heron, & Wil-
liam L. Heward, Multiple Baseline and Changing Criterion Designs, in APPLIED BEHAVIORAL
ANALYSIS 200– 24 (2007); Mark Wolery & Susan R. Harris, Interpreting Results of Single-
Subject Research Designs, 62 PHYSICAL THERAPY 445– 52 (1982).
62. Drug Development, supra note 14, at 17 (manuscript draft). R
63. JANOSKY, supra note 14, at 81; Poling, supra note 40, at 119 (“[T]hese methods R
have been used infrequently in clinical psychopharmacology.”).
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some extent, clinical medicine always has been tailored to the patient in
that each physician-patient relationship is unique, and each clinical
encounter represents the physician’s attempt to provide the optimal care to
the patient in the examining room, the emergency room, the hospital bed,
and the intensive care unit.”64
Responsible administration of medication in the delivery of care
innately centers upon the individual.  A doctor examines the actual effect
that a prescription drug has on a patient by scrutinizing human-drug inter-
actions and individual responsiveness.  Consequently, the global gold stan-
dard for human clinical research in drug development, as recognized by the
ICH, should be modified to include an SSRD component that better deals
with the reality of human variability.
III. A Law-Policy Proposal to Create a Standard Brighter than Gold
While immediate and direct change of the global GD standard for
clinical research at the ICH level is needed, it is impracticable at this time.
The world’s dominant commercial interests comprise half of the ICH’s
sponsors, and more than half of its Steering Committee members.65  More-
over, the ICH is a forum for consensus building on issues with enormous
financial implications— nothing less than pharmaceutical R&D throughout
the World’s largest three markets.  Accordingly, the very nature of the ICH
is to respond to its members based upon their norms, practices, and priori-
ties.66  Therefore, because the ICH members have decades of experience
using GD in clinical research and little exposure to SSRD,67 the ICH, as a
representative of their collective interests, is unlikely to voluntarily deviate
from the familiar gold standard in human clinical research.68  In fact, the
ICH would probably even refuse to contemplate guidelines promoting
SSRD inclusion without initiative from its members.
64. Braff et al., supra note 35, at 9 (citing Burke & Psaty, supra note 58, at 1682– 84). R
65. The United States has been represented by both the FDA and PhRMA, Europe
has been represented by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) and the
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Associations (EFPIA), and Japan has
been represented by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Japan Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA).  In addition to the representatives of these
six sponsors, the Steering Committee includes members of the International Federation
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) and observers from Health
Canada, the World Health Organization, and Swissmedic, Swiss Agency for Therapeutic
Products.  Six conferences have been held, and the ICH7 Conference was scheduled to
take place March 29– 30, 2006, in Vienna, Austria, but was cancelled.  For information
about ICH, see generally Steering Committee, ICH, http://www.ich.org/about/organisa-
tion-of-ich/steering.html (last visited 16 October, 2011).
66. See Vision, ICH, http://www.ich.org/about/vision.html (last visited July 11,
2011) (placing emphasis on consensus building).
67. See supra notes 61– 62 and accompanying text (noting the use of SSRD in many R
disciplines, but largely ignored by biomedicine).
68. John Barton, Keynote Address at the Santa Clara University School of Law
Annual Biotechnology Conference: The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Development:
Race, Markets and Ethics (Mar. 17, 2006).
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The most pragmatic approach to modify the GD standard would be to
effectuate change at the ICH government-participant level to develop
biopharmaceutical R&D experience with SSRD.  Viable options include
initiating change at the European Union level, within individual EU mem-
ber countries which could eventually influence the European Union, or in
the United States.  Arguably the ideal approach would combine all three.
A. Change at the European Union Level
Each of the ICH government participants could initiate modification
of the GD standard.  Among the three options (the United States, Japan,
and the European Union), the European Union’s government and medical
community norms are the most consistent with the notion that SSRD
would introduce— that heightened understanding of new biopharmaceuti-
cals ought to be a prerequisite for market access.
In the European Union, product approval is not the equivalent of mar-
ket access.  Rather, product approval simply introduces an opportunity for
drug sponsors to negotiate with government regulators about cost and
whether to include the drug in the government’s nationalized or socialized
health care systems.69  Moreover, physicians throughout the European
Union are generally accustomed to open rationing and prescribing within
the parameters of practice guidelines.  EU physicians and patients are also
exposed to less direct drug marketing than their U.S. counterparts, and
they tend to be more cautious with new pharmaceuticals.70  For example,
in the United Kingdom, the label and marketing materials for new
pharmaceuticals contain a black triangle symbol as a visual reminder that
they have yet to be tried and tested through market use over time.71  These
differences make it probable that the World Medical Association (WMA)—
the major international organization that represents physicians, works to
ensure their independence, and promotes medical ethics— would be inter-
nally divided over a proposal to officially change the GD standard.  This
internal division could prevent the WMA from effectively opposing such a
change at the EU and ICH levels.72
69. Socialized medicine was actually introduced to fend off socialism. See generally
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?  National Health Reform Abroad,
J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 433, 433– 41 (2004) [hereinafter What They Do].  Increasingly,
patients are shouldering co-payments and turning to private insurance to supplement
government health care coverage, but this is still a world away from the U.S. system that
invites aggressive marketing of physicians and patients. See id; see also TIMOTHY STOLTZ-
FUS JOST, READINGS IN COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter
READINGS].  For example, pharmaceutical coverage under the U.K.’s national system is
means-tested. What They Do, supra, at 435.  Ultimately, prescription medications often
are administered through privately-owned pharmacies that work in conjunction with
their health care systems, and there is an expanding secondary insurance private system
in most markets, but it is supplemental. Id.
70. See sources cited supra note 69. R
71. The Institute of Medicine recommended that the United States adopt the same in
its report on the future of drug safety.  IOM Drug Safety, supra note 11, at 5.3. R
72. For information about the WMA, see generally WMA, http://www.wma.net/en/
10home (last visited July 18, 2011).  The WMA was established in 1947, in sync with the
Nazi doctor trials at Nuremburg, “to ensure the independence of physicians, and to work
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Despite the WMA’s probable lack of opposition, any attempt to modify
a systemic science standard for human clinical research within the Euro-
pean Union would trigger opposition from internal EU interests and exter-
nal U.S. interests.  Alternatively, these interests could be harnessed to
realize the desired change, as addressed below.
B. Change at the EU Member State Level
Efforts could be made to modify the GD standard within the European
Union’s member states in an attempt to motivate change within the ICH.
Compared with the FDA, the European Union’s pharmaceutical gate-
keeper, the European Medicines Agency (EMA), wields far less power over
its member states.  First, the EMA’s drug approval role is limited.  The EMA
permits a dual-approval process that, for non-biotech drugs, gives pharma-
ceutical companies the option of seeking member state approval and reci-
procity.  The system offers drug sponsors the choice between a centralized
EMA process and a decentralized, member state alternative.73  The EMA
also outsources much of its work to national agencies.74  This system
results in national drug approval agencies competing for EMA centralized
review opportunities, while also trying to attract drug sponsors to the indi-
vidual member state review track.  This competition among the national
agencies “to win sufficient volume of work to enable them to retain a strong
scientific and evaluation base which will then assist them in gaining fur-
ther work,”75 leads to practical and administrative issues.  Notably, “[t]he
E.U.’s dual route approval process does more than give the pharmaceutical
companies two bites at the approval apple.  The regulators essentially
divide and conquer themselves.”76
Ultimately, the EMA leaves enforcement to member states, and affords
them considerable deference to control their health care systems.77  In
other words, the EMA makes recommendations to the member states, but
pharmaceutical consumption and compliance depends on the member
states and their choices.78  It is true that “[t]he EMEA is charged with bio-
technology approvals.  It is, however, but a ‘quasi-regulatory body.’  It has
for the highest possible standards of ethical behaviour and care by physicians, at all
times.” About the WMA, WMA, http://www.wma.net/en/60about (last visited July 18,
2011).  The organization actually is a confederation of professional associations that
operates based upon consensus, and the AMA is a powerful member.
73. For general information about the EMA, see generally EUROPEAN MEDICINES
AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).  All biotech drugs
must go through the centralized process. See Central Authorisation of Medicines, EURO-
PEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/?about_
us/general/general_content_000109.jsp (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
74. EU Member States, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/?
ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/partners_and_networks/general/general_content_000219.jsp
(last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
75. Thomas, supra note 2, at 378. R
76. Id. at 377 n.137.  According to one commentator: “That companies have been
selecting the decentralized approval route over the centralized route may suggest a race
to the regulatory bottom.” Id. at 378.
77. See generally READINGS, supra note 69, at 86– 94. R
78. Thomas, supra note 2, at 378. R
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exclusive authority over these decisions through the centralized process,
but it does not have enforcement authority.  Rather, it makes recommenda-
tions to the host nation of the pharmaceutical company at issue.”79
Most individual EU member states could adopt a modified clinical
research policy, given that they avoid the multi-party and division-of-power
government complications associated with the United States.  As observed
by Professor Jost, “in most European countries it is possible for ruling par-
ties to enact and implement health reform legislation . . . .  By contrast, the
governing institutions of the U.S. were in fact designed to block radical
change.”80  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that individual EU member states
could change ICH policy.  In general, the member states compete at least
as much as they collaborate on major economic issues and those affecting
their national health care policies.  Even if internal EU resistance could be
overcome, any effort to change the global clinical research standard at the
EU member state level would not stand up to U.S. interests given their
influence over the ICH, the European Union, and its member states’
national agencies.
In addition to the resistance from U.S. interests, there would probably
be internal EU resistance.  While the U.S. government is arguably sub-
jected (and receptive) to pharmaceutical lobbying on unmatchable levels,81
the European Union also is susceptible.82  As stated by one commentator,
“E.U. regulators are also not immune from outside influence.  As in the
U.S., pharmaceutical companies are seen as powerful lobbyists within the
E.U.”83  As with federal-state tension in the United States, the complica-
tions associated with EU member state pharmaceutical regulations invite
both industry lobbying and gaming by drug sponsors.84
79. Id.
80. What They Do, supra note 69, at 437.  The United States did enact the Patient R
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), and health care reform, federal
and state, is underway. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) as amended by the Health Care and Education Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  However, the gov-
ernment and public are grappling over its implementation, and PPACA is the target of
both legal and financial policy challenges as the existing health care system slides into
financial crisis.  See generally Health Reform: Prospering in a Post-Reform World (Price-
WaterhouseCoopers’s Health Research Inst., May, 2010).
81. “In the U. S., the political clout of the pharmaceutical companies is unparalleled.
Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry has the largest lobbying organization in Washing-
ton.” Thomas, supra note 2, at 376. R
82. The World Health Organization has recognized the same:
The World Health Organization, for example, has concluded that attaining phar-
maceutical cost-containment in Europe “is likely to be a long and difficult pro-
cess” because of “the lobbying power of the pharmaceutical industry.”  The
European Association of Hospital Pharmacists contends that it can attain its
goals “through making contacts and lobbying at the European Commission, the
Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union, the Industrial Pharmacists’
Group and the World Health Organisation’s Europharm Forum, among others.”
Id. at 376 nn.125– 26.
83. Id. at 377 nn.132– 33.
84. For a discussion of PPACA, the national health care legislation, see supra note
80.  “Moreover, the very mix of multi-national and national regulatory structure itself, R
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C. Change at the U.S. Level
In light of the potential for overwhelming resistance from U.S. inter-
ests to changing the ICH science standard for human clinical research at
the EU and EU member state levels, any such attempts would need to
address the U.S. interests head-on.  This would require using both the FDA
and Congress to insert a SSRD standard into industry practice.  Such a
change would not only temper U.S. interests in the European Union, but
would also independently influence the ICH to modify its standard.85
Although changing U.S. industry practice would be difficult in light of
the biopharmaceutical sector’s immense lobbying of the U.S. govern-
ment,86 existing programs provide precedent for getting the desired clinical
research done.87  Moreover, given that the drug development industries
have not been producing a meaningful number of innovative new drugs
and, of those they have produced, several have proven to be serious disap-
pointments, Congress has become dissatisfied and impatient with both the
FDA and the drug development industries.  Congress made this sentiment
clear through enactment of the FDAAA, which increases the amount of
information required during the drug approval process to break from the
established practice of waiting until the delivery of care to gather this infor-
mation.88  The Obama Administration is also establishing a new “industry
assistance” research center— headed by Dr. Francis Collins, Director of NIH
and head of the U.S. government’s effort to map the human genome— to
help jumpstart the drug development industry.89
Due to the U.S. government’s frustration with the drug development
sector, it may be open to adoption of the SSRD standard.  For example, the
new “industry assistance” center’s mission could be expanded to directly
conduct SSRD studies, and to demonstrate their utility in drug develop-
ment.  Also, the U.S. government could introduce a separate program to
directly promote SSRD, extending the accomplishments of the Human Gen-
ome Project into human health benefits by advancing drug development
through SSRD improvements to clinical research.  Besides the direct infu-
sion of government resources to establish the utility of SSRD, FDA regula-
tory precedent could support desired clinical research methods in the
context of drug development.90  The timing for such indirect, regulatory
methods is good; disappointing drug industry performance and ineffective
regulation of the finance and oil industries have increased public and polit-
which allows manufacturers to select the approval route that they find most expeditious,
might best be characterized as ‘establishing a level playing field for business in Europe
and the maintenance of a strong industry.’” Thomas, supra note 2, at 377 n.136. R
85. For a more extensive discussion of the U.S. system in this context, see generally
Drug Development, supra note 14. R
86. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. R
87. See infra text accompanying notes 98– 100. R
88. See generally Evans, supra note 4; Evans, supra note 13; Drug Development, supra R
note 14. R
89. See supra note 49. R
90. See infra notes 99– 102 (Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act) and 103– 104 R
(Orphan Drug Act) and accompanying text.
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ical openness to regulation.91
The FDA must be careful, however, before promulgating regulations
that demand drug sponsors to undertake specific clinical trials because
such demands have been met by litigation challenges in the past.  Specifi-
cally, using the regulatory process to attempt to impose commercial uses
on new drug candidates or specific types of human clinical trials on drug
developers would invite allegations of undue impediment on the discretion
to practice medicine and the commercial freedoms embedded in the pri-
vate market system.  Additionally, it would invite challenges of agency over-
reaching in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.92
A vivid illustration of the FDA’s inability to demand specific research
is the FDA’s attempt to require pediatric studies prior to the Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA).  This attempt prompted a suc-
cessful legal challenge that struck down the FDA’s Pediatric Rule and
necessitated corrective legislation.93  Former FDA Commissioner David
Kessler, who ran the agency while FDAMA was being negotiated, has noted
this limitation:
I need to acknowledge the limits of FDA’s authority.  It is our job to review
drug applications for the indications suggested by the manufacturer.  We do
not have the authority to require manufacturers to seek approval for indica-
tions which they have not studied.  Thus, as a matter of law, if an application
contains indications only for adults, we’re stuck.94
Subsequently, there have been many reminders that the agency may
not interfere with the practice of medicine.  For example, the House Report
that accompanied FDAMA expressly states that the “FDA has no authority
to regulate how physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their
medical practice.  Physicians prescribing off-label uses of approved drugs is
not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.” 95  In 2000, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia went even further when it determined that
FDAMA provisions addressing manufacturer promotion of off-label uses
imposed an undue burden on commercial free speech in violation of the
First Amendment.96
In order to sidestep the issues that FDA requirements present, it would
be more pragmatic to facilitate single subject studies in clinical research
through commercial incentives.  The FDA has attempted to facilitate
pharmacogenomic studies (patient-specific studies based upon genetic var-
91. See David Leonhardt, Underestimating Risk: What the Oil Spill and the Financial
Crisis Have in Common, N.Y. TIMES, Jun 6, 2010, at MM13.
92. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 226 F.
Supp. 2d 204 (D.D.C. 2002).
93. See Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408
(2002) [hereinafter BPCA] (codified as amended in sections throughout 21 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
94. David Kessler, Speech of FDA Commissioner to the American Academy of Pediat-
rics (Oct. 14, 1992), quoted in Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F.
Supp. 2d 204, 218 (D.D.C. 2002).
95. H.R. REP. NO. 105-310, at 60 (1997).
96. See generally Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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iations, or alleles) through guidelines, but the effort has proven futile with-
out tangible commercial incentives.97  Through commercial incentives, the
FDA could and should facilitate SSRD to make clinical research more repre-
sentative of the delivery of health care, and bridge the two fields.98
The effectiveness of commercial incentives to encourage desired meth-
ods of clinical research has been demonstrated through the BPCA.  This
legislation reinstated the FDAMA voluntary program for pediatric testing
with the incentive of six months of market exclusivity.99  The BPCA then
went further by empowering the FDA to step over manufacturer resistance
and complete pediatric trials under the agency’s oversight, either by using
third parties through the NIH, or with funding from a federal trust.100  The
BPCA has been effective.  As of March 2004, just two years after Congress
enacted the legislation, pharmaceutical manufacturers had issued 346
requests to evaluate prescription drugs for pediatric use, 97 drugs had
been granted six months of exclusivity, and new labels had been approved
for 70.101  By February 2008, 145 drugs had been granted pediatric
exclusivity.102
Similarly, the United States has successfully incentivized the drug
development industries to perform desired pharmaceutical R&D under the
Orphan Drug Act (ODA).  This Act creates a rewards-based program that
makes it commercially viable to develop drugs for small groups of patients
by providing tax incentives, a seven-year period of market exclusivity, and
other benefits.103  As a result, the desired research now is being accom-
plished— some 350 orphan drugs have been approved in the U.S. market
alone, and the program has been replicated by other countries.104
The market performance of the United States-based drug development
industries speaks for itself: a quarter-century downturn and a defined fif-
teen-year slump in new drug approvals, as well as many market disappoint-
ments despite enormous industries, vast government investment, and
97. See Genomics Revolution?, supra note 16, at 93; see generally FOOD AND DRUG R
ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMIS-
SIONS (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation?/
Guidances/UCM126957.pdf.; 21 C.F.R. § 58, ch. 1, Pts. 300– 69 (2010).
98. See generally Drug Development, supra note 14. R
99. 42 U.S.C. § 284m(b), (c)(7) (2006).
100. Id.
101. Leslie Kushner, Incentivizing Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product Safety Testing
with Extension of Exclusivity Periods, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 519,
547– 48 (2009); see Rosemary Roberts, http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/?presenta-
tion/FDAMA-FDA%20Persp-Roberts2004/sld008.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (on
file with author).
102. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., Drugs to Which FDA has Granted Pediatric Exclusivity for
Pediatric Studies under Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, available
at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/?DevelopmentResources/
ucm050005.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
103. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 94-414 § 526(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb) (2000); Mark D. Shtilerman, Pharmaceutical Inventions:
A Proposal for Risk-Sensitive Rewards, 46 IDEA 337, 337 (2006).
104. 2010 Report, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/annual-reports/2010 (last visited
Mar. 5, 2010).
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cutting-edge enabling technology associated with genomic science.105  To
help solve this problem, the United States could and should enact legisla-
tion to commercially incentivize a shift from the GD standard to one that
promotes SSRD.  One option is direct government funding of SSRD studies,
possibly by using the new “industry assistance” center created by President
Obama.  Another option is indirect government regulation that provides
commercial incentives, similar to the BPCA and ODA, to engage in SSRD
studies.
If SSRD succeeds in lifting drug development in the United States out
of its present doldrums, it could create a “race to the top” among drug
makers, which would lessen the overwhelming resistance from U.S. inter-
ests to similar change in the European Union and its member nations.
This increased acceptance by drug development industries would then
pressure the ICH, as a representative of its members’ collective interests, to
modify GD as its gold standard.  By incorporating SSRD, drug development
would shift its focus to the reality of specificity associated with the genetic
science that increasingly dominates the drug development pipeline, and
would move drug development closer to the reality of the practice of
medicine.
Conclusion
Pharmaceutical R&D is an increasingly global endeavor, with consid-
erable human health and economic implications.106  The United States,
European Union, and Japan have attempted to coordinate market access
through ICH standard sharing that promotes the acceptance of clinical
research data among the world’s three largest drug markets, thereby elimi-
nating duplication and waste.107  A danger of the ICH, with group decision
making by representatives from three governments and industry represent-
atives from several world markets, is its susceptibility to excessive industry
influence and the entrenchment of standards that need modification.108
This Article and its domestic FDA law-policy counterpart109 have
asserted that the current shared global standard for human clinical
research, GD, is antiquated and should be modified with an SSRD compo-
nent.  The underlying problem is that GD is not responsive enough to the
reality of human variability, which is innate to the practice of medicine, or
to genetics science, which increasingly dominates drug development.110
105. See supra notes 49– 50 and accompanying text. R
106. See supra notes 4– 6 (global clinical research through CROs), 24– 26 (ICH), R
30– 31 (CROs global presence) and accompanying text. R
107. See, e.g., E9 Guidance, supra note 1; see generally supra notes 1– 3 and accompa- R
nying text; ICH WEBSITE, supra note 1.  The United States is the largest market, followed R
by Europe. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 375. R
108. The Steering Committee is dominated by industry representatives. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text (identifying the ICH composition). R
109. See generally Drug Development, supra note 14. R
110. See supra notes 36– 37 (GD and human variability), 61– 64 (clinical research and R
the individualized nature of medicine) and accompanying text; see generally Drug Devel-
opment, supra note 14. R
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Also, the GD approach places too much reliance on the medical profession
working with patients over time.  It relies on information gathered outside
of the human clinical research context to fully establish clinical care under-
standing— a fact recognized by the U.S. Congress through the FDAAA.111
Because drug developers are relying on this antiquated standard, the
biopharmaceutical sectors are in a fifteen-year slump in new drug approv-
als, and of those that have reached the market, many continue to cause
millions of adverse events annually in the United States alone.112  This
Article argues that the basic science standard for human clinical research
in pharmaceutical R&D needs to be modified to reflect the present and
future— an SSRD component must be added to human clinical research.
Doing so would not only shift the focus of clinical trials from group aver-
ages to a specific individual focus, bringing it in line with the actual prac-
tice of medicine, but would also reap the benefits of the genomics
revolution.
The ICH’s reluctance to change a scientific standard as rooted as GD is
expected, given that the ICH is representative of its members’ collective
interest, and that these members depend on human clinical research for
drug development.113  Therefore, this Article has probed law-policy strate-
gies at the ICH member level, including efforts focused at the European
Union, its member states, and the United States.  The Article has shown
that, while the European Union’s government and medical community
norms are more consistent with SSRD, the influence from U.S. interests is
likely to overwhelm any modification to the GD standard.114
This Article’s ultimate proposal is that the United States should com-
mercially incentivize the drug development industries to infuse an SSRD
standard into their clinical research through direct government funding,
indirect government regulation, or a combination of the two approaches.
Doing so would lessen the resistance from U.S. interests and could
encourage a similar shift in the European Union.  As SSRD gains popular-
ity, it would pressure the ICH to modify its GD gold standard to include a
SSRD component, which could lead to a “race to the top” among drug man-
ufacturers that would both break the slump in new drug approvals and
align human clinical research with the practice of medicine.
111. See supra notes 12– 13 and accompanying text. R
112. See supra notes 44– 47 and accompanying text (adverse events and associated R
deaths) as well as notes 49– 50 and accompanying text (15-year slump in drug R
approvals).
113. See supra notes 67– 68 and accompanying text. R
114. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
